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This paper analyses the extent of rigidities in wage setting in Great Britain over the 1980s and 
1990s. Our estimation strategy, which generalizes the work of Altonji and Devereux (2000), 
models the notional wage growth distribution – the distribution of nominal wage growth that 
would occur in the absence of rigidities in pay – while allowing for the presence of measurement 
error in the data. The model then allows for the possibility that the nominal wage growth of a 
fraction of the workforce may be subject to a nominal or real downward rigidity. Our model 
suggests that real rigidities in wage setting are more prevalent than nominal rigidities, although 
the incidence of these real wage rigidities has fallen gradually over time. If firms cannot cut real 
wages in response to negative demand shocks they may resort to laying-off workers. Our results 
support this micro-foundation of the wage-unemployment Phillips curve: workers who are more 



















 1  Introduction 
 
Research into the causes and consequences of both nominal and real wage 
rigidities has a long and distinguished tradition in economics.  Macroeconomists have 
traditionally appealed to wage rigidities as an explanation for the failure of wages to 
respond to (changes in) the unemployment rate (see, for example, Layard et. al. 
(1991)).  More recently, rigidities in the labour market have been found to 
dramatically improve the ability of the monetary models of the New Neoclassical 
synthesis
 literature to reproduce plausible time series profiles for output, inflation and 
the real wage over the business cycle (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)).  
In this paper, we search for evidence of downward wage rigidities in panel 
microdata covering Great Britain.  If these rigidities reduce the responsiveness of 
wages to a deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, then at the micro level we 
should expect to find evidence of ‘too many’ workers who report wage freezes, and 
‘too few’ wage cuts.  Although attention has almost exclusively
1 focused on the 
presence of nominal rigidities in panel microdata, we might expect that real wages are 
also sticky.  This paper explores the incidence of both nominal and real, or ‘cost of 
living’, rigidities in wages. 
Of course there is no reason to believe that the incidence of these wage 
rigidities should be static over time.  A decline in the inflation rate is likely to increase 
the fraction of the workforce who are at risk of a nominal wage cut, so the incidence 
of nominal wage freezes is likely to rise.  Conversely, structural changes in the labour 
market such as the decline in trade union power, may have reduced the mechanisms 
which protect workers from either nominal or real pay cuts.  A key aim of this paper 
                                                 
1 See Schweitzer (2003) for an exception: using the non-parametric methodology proposed by Kahn 
(1997), he is able to identify distortions in the nominal wage growth distribution consistent with real 
rigidities in wage setting in the data used in this paper. 
  1is to establish whether there has indeed been a shift in the degree of rigidity in wages 
at the micro level – which can shed some light on whether the British labour market 
has indeed become more flexible at the macro level. 
The starting point for our analysis is the model of Altonji and Devereux 
(2000) which allows for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity and 
measurement error in wage setting.  This paper applies an extended version of that 
model
2 which allows us to jointly estimate the incidence of nominal and real wage 
rigidities in panel microdata and thereby their impact on the nominal wage growth 
distribution.  Our model allows that workers may fall under one of three regimes – 
where the growth in their nominal wage is bounded from below either by zero (what 
we call the nominal rigidity regime) or their expectation of the inflation rate (what we 
call the real rigidity regime), or where the growth in their nominal wage is 
unconstrained (what we call the flexible or unconstrained regime).  Using annual data 
on wages taken from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) we 
investigate the trends in these regimes over the period: 1978 to 1998.   
One reason macroeconomists are interested in wage rigidities is that they can 
potentially offer an explanation for the behaviour of unemployment over the business 
cycle: if firms cannot cut wages in the face of a demand shock, they may have to 
resort to layoffs.  Our model generates an estimate of the degree to which rigidities 
drive a wedge between the wage that reflects productivity, and the wage the firm 
actually pays.  This should help explain the pattern of job destruction at the micro 
level.  We investigate this hypothesis at the end of the paper. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 summarises the data on 
which this research is based.  Section 3 gives an overview of the underlying macro-
                                                 
2 The econometric model used in this paper was developed with fellow members of the International 
Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP). 
  2environment over the sample period before highlighting the key features of the 
nominal wage growth distribution which we believe any reasonable model must 
reproduce.  Section 4 describes how we have modified Altonji and Devereux’s 
approach to allow for the presence of both real and nominal rigidities in wage setting, 
and the idiosyncrasies of our estimation. Section 5 outlines the key results of our 
model.  Section 6 investigates whether the pattern of job destruction in the dataset is 
indeed consistent with the incidence of wage rigidities our model describes, and hence 
whether our results support the link between rigidities and business cycle movements 
in unemployment described in macro-theory.   
2  The Data 
 
The data on which this research is based is the New Earnings Survey Panel 
Dataset (NESPD); for more details on this dataset  Schweitzer (2003).  The NESPD 
contains information in panel form on the earnings and employment conditions of a 
random one percent sample of the workforce since 1975.  The data is collected from 
employers, who are legally obliged to provide information on the various components 
of pay, hours worked for a specified week in April, together with data on their 
employees age, sex, occupation and job and whether their pay was affected by a 
collective agreement, wage council or absence.  For the purposes of this paper we 
define the wage as the gross hourly pay exclusive of overtime of full-time workers 
who have been in the same job for a year or more and whose pay was unaffected by 
absence.   
3  A Preview: A Picture of Nominal Wage Growth in Great Britain 
 
We characterise the (nominal) wage growth distribution using a simple 50 bin 
histogram where individuals are collected into bins of one percentage point in width 
  3(where all outliers are collected into the outside bins).  In Figure 1 we illustrate the 
distribution of nominal wage growth for the year to April 1995 which highlights 
particularly well the key features of the distribution.  For reference, we highlight the 
points in the distribution which correspond to zero nominal wage growth and the 
inflation rate over the preceding year, in the month to February (which was the most 
recent observation on retail price inflation available to agents on the 1
st April). 
Three key features of these distributions are worthy of particular comment.  
First, the size of the first and last bins of the histograms – which suggest either that 
large pay cuts and increases are common, or that data is polluted by measurement 
error.  Second, the ‘spike’ in the distribution which corresponds to a nominal pay 
freeze (zero pay growth).  Third, the large number of observations clustered around 
the inflation rate.  Ultimately, the final arbiter of our model will be its ability to 
reproduce these features at a given point in time and their variation in time series.  We 
now turn to discuss each of these three features. 
In the year to April 1995 more than one in ten of our sample enjoyed an 
increase in their nominal wage in excess of 35% or a cut in excess of 15%.  Variation 
in the rate of nominal pay growth across workers on this scale is a somewhat 
surprising feature of our data.  While there are a number of plausible explanations for 
significant variation in hourly wages from one year to the next in the absence of a 
change in job it is likely that some of these observations reflect measurement error.  
Smith (2000) finds that measurement error can explain a significant proportion 
of both the nominal rigidity and the incidence of wage cuts.  But her analysis was 
based on survey data, while we have access to payroll data that employers are legally 
obliged to provide, which according to Nickell and Quintini (2003) “ensures a high 
  4degree of accuracy”.
3  However, there remains the possibility that mistakes in 
compiling and inputting data on hourly wages will introduce errors in our data.  And 
any undetected changes in job description – especially promotions and demotions – 
are likely to lead to large absolute wage changes.  While the probability of each 
individual wage level observation being mismeasured in the panel is in all likelihood 
low, the reality is that when these errors occur they may well result in large errors in 
our estimates of wage growth.   
That there exist nominal rigidities in wage setting in the UK over this period 
appears almost incontrovertible.  We can clearly observe a spike in the nominal wage 
growth distribution in the bin of the histogram corresponding to (near) zero wage 
growth   over the year 1994/5.  The spike is also apparent in years 
of double digit inflation, though smaller in size.  But it is the extent to which there is a 
disproportionate mass of observations in this bin of the histogram that is key to 
identifying the rigidity. 
% . w % . 5 0 5 0 < ≤ − &
We think of downward real wage rigidities as any mechanism which attempts 
to protect workers from a cut in their ex-post real wage by protecting them from cuts 
in their expected real wage.  But we do not expect to see a spike in the nominal wage 
growth distribution at some expectation of inflation, akin to that we see at zero on 
account of nominal rigidities.  Expectations of the increase in the cost of living will 
vary across agents in the economy, not least because the timing of wage bargains will 
vary so agents have access to different information sets.  As a result, we would expect 
real wage rigidities to deliver a clustering of observations over an interval in the 
nominal wage distribution (rather than at a precise point), where the width of that 
interval is determined by how diffuse the distribution of inflation expectations is (at 
                                                 
3 In the validation exercises, Card and Hyslop (1997) and Bound et. al. (1989), payroll data of this kind 
is typically taken as the truth against which the survey responses are compared. 
  5the time workers agree their settlement).  Given the behaviour of inflation over the 
period it is likely that the dispersion of these expectations will also have varied 
significantly over the period.  . 
4  The Econometric Model 
 
The econometric model which we employ in this paper to explain the 
distribution of nominal wage growth across workers in the NESPD extends the model 
presented by Altonji and Devereux (2000) to account for real wage rigidities.  We 
allow that workers may fall under one of three regimes.  Wages may be flexible or 
unconstrained, in which case their wage is unprotected and set equal to the notional 
wage on all occasions.  Alternatively, wages may be subject to nominal rigidities, 
where we assume that the nominal wage growth is bound from below by zero.   
Finally, wages may be subject to real rigidities, where we assume that nominal wage 
growth is bound from below by an expectation of inflation.  See the Appendix for a 
derivation of the specific likelihood function used in these estimates. 
The essence of this paper is the estimation of the time series variation in the 
fractions of the workforce who are protected from nominal and real pay cuts through 
the distortions they create in the nominal wage growth distribution.  As well as 
potentially increasing the mass in the extreme tails of the distribution, errors in the 
data are also likely to smooth out any distortions in the underlying distribution of 
nominal pay growth.  It therefore follows that if the incidence of errors in the data 
varies from year to year then this may lead to a corresponding variation in our 
estimates of the fraction of the workforce who lie in each of the regimes
4.  We 
                                                 
4 So, for example in the case of the nominal regime, for a given spike in the observed 
nominal pay growth distribution, the greater the incidence of errors in the data the 
greater the underlying spike must have been in the actual distribution, and therefore 
  6therefore allow for a small yet significant degree of measurement error, which is 
constant across the sample period
5. The NESPD has had only minor methodology 
changes and steady large sample making this assumption reasonable.   
Our model assumes that depending on which regime workers fall in, zero or an 
expectation of the inflation rate forms a lower bound on the actual wage growth 
distribution, so that only wage changes above these thresholds are set according to the 
notional wage relationship.  We use this assumption to identify the notional 
relationship.  Focusing on the right-hand tail of the nominal wage growth distribution, 
we simulate the conditional mean notional wage change for our set of covariates using 
a quantile regression at the 75th percentile. 
If the model is estimated year by year it is likely that the marginal effect of a 
given covariate on the relative propensity to fall in each of the regimes to vary from 
year to year; however the concept of wage rigidities suggest a longer-term departure 
from fully flexible wages.    It is probable that most industries have at least one year 
in which the vast majority of individuals received substantial nominal wage increases.  
We therefore estimate the window over a five-year time frame as it is less likely that 
an industry or group will repeatedly do much better than average five years in a row.   
5  Results 
For each of the windows of data over which we estimate the model we obtain 
a set of parameters which describe the key behavioural relationships in the model: the 
rate of notional wage growth, the variability in notional wage growth and the relative 
propensities for wage growth to be bound from below by zero or an expectation of the 
                                                                                                                                            
by implication the greater the proportion of the sample who must be in the nominal 
regime. 
5 We ‘assume’ that 89 % of observations in the NESPD are correctly measured.  This 
value was chosen via a grid search: it was the value of   which gave the highest 
average value of the likelihood when the model was estimated over successive five 
year windows of the sample period (see later). 
q
  7inflation rate, together with a series of constants which specify the mean and standard 
deviation of the lower bound for wage growth in the real regime and an estimate of 
the standard deviation of measurement error in the NESPD.  In order to set these 
results in perspective, we shall first review the results obtained when the model is 
estimated over a particular five year windows (the five years of wage growth centred 
on the year to April 1995) to build up an explanation of the pattern of wage growth in 
that period, before turning to a more comprehensive review of our results over the 
period as a whole. 
Our model begins with a description of the underlying or notional wage 
growth relationship.  This is effectively identified outside as in input to the likelihood 
function using quantile regression techniques to pin down a conditional quantile 
function of the notional wage growth distribution.  This distribution reflects a simple 
wage growth equation where we include the age of each individual and its square and 
a series of occupational and industrial dummy variables.  The coefficients on the age 
terms imply a standard lifetime earnings profile, with the rate of wage growth falling 
monotonically with age.  Of the remaining controls, five industry dummies are 
significant, while only one occupational dummy is.   
We find that other things equal, the standard deviation of notional wage 
growth declines with age, and this relationship is statistically significant, consistent 
with younger workers doing more ‘job shopping’.  Moreover, we find that the 
majority of our industrial controls are significant, and all the occupational controls 
are, along with our control for whether an individual was covered by a union 
agreement.  Combining these results implies that the estimates of the notional wage 
distribution will be a mixture of several distinct normals, which would allow the 
  8notional to potentially deviate from symmetry, unimodality, and other restrictions 
implied by normality. 
  Our model allows for the possibility that only a fraction of the 
workforce will have their wages protected.  In table 1 we illustrate the estimated 
fraction of different sub-samples of the workforce who fall in each of the three 
regimes.  
  The key result illustrated in the table above is that real rigidities are far 
more prevalent than nominal rigidities.  We estimate that in this period a little over 
two in five workers in the sample are members of the real rigidity regime.  Of the 
remainder, three out of every four fall in the unconstrained regime so only about 15 % 
of workers are found to fall in the nominal rigidity regime.  In terms of which 
individuals are members of the real regime it is very much a case of the usual 
suspects: older workers, those in the public sector, and those covered by union 
agreements have the highest proportion in the real regime.   
Our model also produces an estimate of the mean and standard deviation of 
the expectation of inflation which forms the lower bound on wage growth in the real 
regime.  Our results imply that the mean of the lower bound on wage growth in the 
real regime in the year to April 1995 was 2.6 %.  This figure should be set against a 
rate of RPI inflation in the year to February 1994 (the latest observation on retail 
inflation available to wage bargainers) of 2.4%, and a rate of RPI inflation of 3.3% in 
the year to April 1995 (the period over which wage growth is measured in the 
NESPD).  This result corroborates our assumption that the lower bound on the wage 
growth in the real regime is an approximate peg with the cost of living.  The standard 
deviation of this lower bound on wage growth for individuals in the real regime is 
about 0.6 percentage points in 1994.   
  9Finally, we also estimate of the standard deviation of measurement error in the 
NESPD, given the model’s estimate of 89% of the observations are correctly 
measured.  The standard deviation of measurement error in nominal wage growth is 
estimated to be about 34 percentage points.  This confirms our suspicion that when 
they occur, errors are likely to lead to extreme wage growth observations. 
One way to illustrate how well our model performs is by simulating the actual 
nominal wage growth distribution for the year 1994/5 using the estimated parameters.  
The top left hand corner of figure 2 illustrates the actual distribution of nominal wage 
growth (within a specified range
6) and the bottom right hand corner we illustrate our 
result.  Generally, our model is able to reproduce most characteristics of the actual 
distribution. The simulation with an estimate of the distribution of predicted mean 
notional wage growth for groups as previously discussed, which is tightly 
concentrated.  Once the stochastic component representing individual-level variation 
in notional wage growth is included, the distribution becomes more disperse than the 
raw data.  In the middle row of the figure we illustrate the simulated wage growth 
distributions for individuals in each of the three regimes.  Since the rigidity regimes 
can only generate wage cuts through measurement error it is indeed the case that the 
mass in the left hand tail of the actual distribution is accounted for primarily by the 
unconstrained regime.  In terms of the clusters of observations in the distribution, the 
nominal regime generates the clear spike at zero as we might expect.  Perhaps more 
interestingly, the real regime illustrates a more diffuse clustering of observations, 
                                                 
6 We concentrate on those wage growth observations that fall in the range 
, collecting all observations outside this range into the extreme 
bins of the histogram.  Although this does not allow us to compare how well the 
model fits the density  of extreme wage growth observations, it still allows us to 
compare how well the model fits the frequency of these observations. 
% 5 . 35 ˆ % 5 . 14 < ≤ − w
  10which reflects the non-trivial standard deviation of the lower bound we highlighted 
earlier.   
Finally in the bottom left and bottom centre panels of the figure we illustrate 
the distortion in the distribution created by each of these rigidity regimes, by focusing 
on the density of actual wage growth observations in each regime who are swept up to 
the spike.  Quite apart from the fact that more individuals are in the real rather than 
the nominal regime, these figures illustrate why the aggregate wage sweep is larger 
for the former rather than the latter regime.. 
So how well does our model fit the underlying characteristics of the data and 
how important is the inclusion of the real regime?  Figure 3 illustrates the fit of the 
model.  The blue line is the difference between the fraction of the sample attributed to 
each histogram bin in the data versus the full model.  While the performs reasonably 
well, it is clear that our model allocates insufficient mass at both the nominal spike at 
zero and the cluster around the expectation of inflation.  The under-prediction in the 
interval   is equivalent to a little over one per cent of the NES 
sample, and the under-prediction in the interval 
% . w % . 5 0 5 0 < ≤ − &
% . w % . 5 3 5 2 < ≤ &  is equivalent to a 
little over three per cent of the NES sample.  The importance of allowing for the fact 
that a significant fraction of the workforce have their real wages protected is 
immediately obvious from the alternative simulation shown by the red line in Figure 
3.  When we switch off the real regime in our model, the fit of the model deteriorates 
dramatically. 
We now turn to summarise the time series variation in our results. Taking the 
two decades of data as a whole, one can identify the following broad trends in the size 
of the three regimes (see Figure 4). First, there was a gradual decline in the share of 
the real rigidity regime.  Second, the share of the nominal rigidity regime was broadly 
  11constant.  Third, there was therefore an increase in the share of the workforce who 
were protected from neither real nor nominal wage cuts.  Between 1977/8 and 1997/8 
the fraction of the sample in the unconstrained regime rose by over 25 percentage 
points.  In this sense, our results do indicate that the British labour market has become 
more flexible.  Furthermore, simulations based on holding the parameters of our 
model fixed at their estimated values using the first window of data reveals that little 
of this change is associated with the changing characteristics of the workforce.
7  .   
We also find that throughout the sample period, the estimate of lower bound 
on wage growth is consistent with the underlying rate of retail price inflation.  In 
Figure 5 we graph the implied mean lower bound on nominal wage growth against the 
latest observation on the rate of RPI inflation at the beginning of the year (RPI 
inflation to February) and the rate of RPI inflation over the year (RPI inflation to 
April). There was considerable volatility from month to month in the rate of inflation 
at the start of our sample period so would might expect agents to have been uncertain 
over the likely path for inflation in the future. In the model increased uncertainty over 
inflation should be reflected in the large standard deviation of the real regime lower 
bound..  The estimated standard deviation of the lower bound falls by a factor of two 
between the 1970s and the mid 1980s and then again by a factor of two by the end of 
the sample period (Figure 6).  Finally, as we move further towards the low and stable 
inflation environment of the late 1990s we find that our two alternative observations 
on the rate of RPI inflation generally fall inside the approximate 95% confidence 
interval around our estimate of the lower bound on wage growth.  We think this is 
strong evidence that the lower bound on wage growth primarily reflects expected 
inflation.   
                                                 
7 Due to space limitations we do not show these simulations.  They are available in 
Bank of England Working Paper. 
  12Over time the fraction of the workforce whose wage growth is constrained on 
account of protection from real wage cuts is found to decline (see Figure 7).   
However, as the rate of inflation falls over the sample period and the notional wage 
growth distribution shifts to the left, the fraction of the workforce swept up to the 
spike at zero increases somewhat. Once again given our estimates we can calculate 
the distortion in the wage growth distribution generated by these regimes.  Our results 
suggest that over the 1990s the cumulative effect of sweeping up all real notional 
wage cuts in this regime raises average wage growth by around two percentage points 
(see Figure 8).  The contribution of the nominal rigidity regime is significantly lower– 
the cumulative impact of sweeping up all nominal wage cuts always adds less than 
fifty basis points to the average rage of wage growth. 
 
6  Consequences: the link between Rigidities and Unemployment 
 
Macroeconomists are primarily interested in wage rigidities because they have 
the potential to explain the behaviour of unemployment over the business cycle.  A 
key feature of the model presented in this paper is that some workers are protected 
from nominal or real cuts in pay. Laying-off workers is a costly process so we might 
expect a zone of inaction where small deviations of wages from the level implied by 
productivity (as described by the notional wage relationship) do not lead firms to start 
laying-off workers.  But any reasonable model of labour demand ought to predict that 
the probability of job destruction should be increasing in the size of wedge between 
the actual wage and the notional wage.  
Our results indicated that the notional wage growth distribution is varied 
enough for that notional wage changes below zero or the inflation rate are never rare 
and sometimes quite common and that workers vary in their likelihood of being 
  13protected from pay cuts.  It follows then that there is considerable variation in the size 
of the expected wage sweeps (the difference between notional and realized wage 
growth). If wage rigidities play an important role in fluctuations in unemployment 
over the business cycle then the variation in the size of these wage sweeps at the 
individual level should help explain the pattern of job destruction.  That is the final 
hypothesis we investigate in this paper.  To be clear, we are not directly investigating 
a link between the incidence of wage rigidities and the unemployment rate, but rather 
the link between the incidence of wage rigidities and the gross outflow from 
employment (job destruction).  But inflow shocks are central to understanding the 
behaviour of unemployment over the business cycle (see Burgess and Turon (2005)). 
We wish to test whether the size of the expected wage sweep helps explain the 
pattern of job destruction in the data.  We therefore need to calculate what the 
notional wage and the probability of falling in each of the regimes would have been 
for individuals who lose their job, which then allows us to calculate what their 
expected sweep would have been.  It goes without saying that we can only estimate 
these hypothetical expected sweeps using data on the sub-sample of individuals who 
keep their job from one year to the next, but these estimates can be applied to both 
workers keeping and losing their current job.   
Given our data source – annual observations from payroll data – we can only 
capture job destruction at an annual frequency. We experiment with two measures of 
job destruction: our favoured definition which focuses on those individuals who are in 
the NESPD (and therefore employed) in year t-1 but are absent in year t, and a looser 
definition which allows the individual to be in the NESPD in year t, so long as they 
report changing their job.  Our results, which are presented in the table 2, indicate that 
the expected wage sweep does help explain the pattern of job destruction. We include 
  14simple demographic characteristics of the individuals (age, age squared, and sex) that 
might alter the flow rates in the cross-sections independently. Having a larger 
expected sweep is statistically associated with both a higher probability of not being 
employed in the next year and with some change in jobs between the two years.  
The expected level of sweep is influenced by a variety of factors, but clearly 
the probability of being in the rigid regimes and the location of the notional wage 
distribution both change substantially from year to year.  These and other factor 
causes the expected wage sweep to vary substantially from year to year, with average 
expected sweep peaking in 1990 at 0.4 percentage points, but dropping to less than a 
basis point in 1980.  While this is certainly variation appropriate for identifying the 
effects of wages sweeps on employment flows one of the advantages of our estimates 
is that they allow the same effects to identified cross-sectionally. Table 2 also repeats 
the panel regressions with a full set of year dummy variables which absorb all of the 
time-series variation in the data and the estimates of effects of expected wage sweep 
on subsequent status rise slightly. The standard errors in these estimates remain very 
small. 
Of course we are really interested in the economic significance of the expected 
wage sweep variable – not its statistical significance in our regressions.  With many 
zeros, the average sweep in the data is 0.0024, so on average having no wage sweep 
would lower the flow by around ½ a percentage point in both equations for the 
representative person.   However, in 1990, when actual wage growth slowed and the 
wage floor in the real regime increased markedly, the average sweep rises to 0.0043, 
increasing the predicted flow rate by a further 0.4 percentage points.  By 1996, wage 
growth is relative strong (5%) compared to the wage floor in the real regime (3%) and 
the fraction of the workforce who are protected from real pay cuts has also fallen.  As 
  15a result, the predicted outflow rate falls by a percentage point between 1990 and 1996.  
These do not directly translate in different unemployment rates, mostly because we do 
not observe hiring rates, but the underlying mechanism for rigidities to create 
unemployment is certainly evident.  
To examine the role of the various factors that underpin these expected wage 
sweeps in greater depth we now focus on the variation in the implied job destruction 
rates for a representative pair of workers in cross-section and time-series.  Consider 
two thirty five year old men: one is a plant operative in the manufacturing sector; the 
other is a manager in the financial sector.  For much of the sample period, finance 
managers enjoyed faster nominal wage growth, and are therefore less likely to be at 
risk of real or nominal pay cuts.  Changes in the probability of these workers falling 
under the real or nominal rigidity regimes therefore has no impact on the expected 
wage sweep - and therefore the predicted probability of job destruction – for a typical 
finance manager in most years.  But changes in the probability of being protected 
from real or nominal pay cuts matter for the exit rate of the typical plant operative 
(green line in Figure 9).  If his probability of being protected from pay cuts increases 
– to match those of an otherwise identical public sector worker – the probability of the 
typical plant operative losing his job can rise by as much as a percentage point, in 
years where his expected wage falls below the lower bound in the real regime (pink 
line).  And for plant operatives with below average notional wage growth (blue line) – 
for whom the downward wage rigidities are more likely to bind – outflow rates are 
affected over even more of the sample period, and by a much larger amount (red line).   
The impact on outflow rates of increasing the probability that a plant operative 
is protected from pay cuts varies from year to year.  That reflects two factors: first, the 
change in the probability of falling under these regimes varies from year to year; 
  16second, and more importantly for our purposes, the rate of notional wage growth 
relative to the lower bounds in these regimes for our workers varies from year to year. 
Another key determinant of the expected wage sweep is the level of the lower 
bound in the real regime relative to the rate of notional wage growth.  Other things 
equal, the higher the lower bound the higher the fraction of the workforce who are 
potentially protected from ‘real’ pay cuts.  Consider the impact of increasing the 
lower bound in the real regime for our typical finance manager (green line in Figure 
10) by one standard deviation (pink line).  Over most of the sample period median 
notional wage growth is still high enough to ensure that our typical finance manager is 
not affected by this ‘error’.  But for those finance managers further down the notional 
wage growth distribution (blue line), there is a large impact on predicted outflows 
over most of the sample period (red line).  But by the mid 1990s there is so little 
variation in the lower bound of the real regime (Figure 6) that the impact on outflow 
rates is marginal.  These results consider just a handful of the cases explored in the 
regressions shown in Table 2.  However, they do indicate that variation in the 
exposure of workers to wage rigidities, and in particular real wage rigidities, can alter 
their prospects of remaining employed in their current job.  
7  Conclusions 
 
Casual inspection of the distribution of nominal wage growth across a 
representative sample of British workers reveals three striking features: a clear and 
now well remarked spike in the distribution at zero, a clear clustering of observations 
around the prevailing rate of retail price inflation and for want of a better description 
‘fat tails’.  In this paper we have argued that the first two of these features of the wage 
growth distribution are the product of rigidities in wage setting which protect workers 
from cuts in their nominal and (expected) real wage respectively. The final feature of 
  17the distribution is largely a by-product of measurement error of various kinds in 
earnings data. We estimate a model capable of including all of these features on a rich 
source of data on pay growth in Great Britain, and find that both nominal and real 
rigidities are needed to fit the pattern of wage changes seen in this data.   
However, the frequencies of these rigidities are not constant over the sample 
period..  The fraction of the workforce whose wages are unconstrained has increased 
since the late 1970s. Conversely, the fraction of the workforce whose nominal wage 
growth is bound from below by an expectation of inflation has fallen; with the 
fraction for whom zero is the lower bound remaining broadly constant.  On this basis 
we argue that the labour market has indeed become more flexible over this period.   
Our model also recognised the fact that when workers and firms agree nominal 
increases in hourly wages for the forthcoming year they do not know with certainty 
what the rate of inflation in the cost of living will be.  On this our results are quite 
intuitive: the mean of the lower bound tracks somewhat between observations on 
inflation available to agents when the wage is agreed and inflation out-turns over the 
following year.  In other words, our results suggest that agents are not naïve, in that 
they are able to predict the direction if not the extent of changes in inflation over the 
near future.  Perhaps more interestingly, we find that the standard deviation of this 
lower bound falls sharply over time, which likely reflects the gradual improvement in 
the credibility of monetary policy focusing on a fixed inflation target after 1992. 
Finally, the estimated rigidities lead to potentially meaningful deviations away 
from the unconstrained notional wage.  And where wages deviate from the notional 
the probability of lay-offs might be expected to increase.  Our results confirm this 
hypothesis: rigidities in wage setting lead to economically significant variation in the 
job destruction rate at the micro level.    
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Figure 3: The Fit of the model with and without real 
rigidities: Actual minus Frequencies 
Figure 4: Size of the Three Wage Setting 


























-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35













  21Figure 5: The lower bound in the real 
regime (%) 
Figure 6: Variation in the lower bound 
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Figure 7 : The incidence of real and 
nominal wage freezes (%) 
Figure 8: The incidence of real and 


























Figure 9: Impact of changes in the 
probability of being protected from pay 
cuts: plant operatives 
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Table 1 : Variation in Membership of Regime by Characteristics (%) 
 
Variable Real  Regime  Nominal Regime Unconstrained 
young  36.4 16.5 47.1 
old  44.3 13.9 41.8 
public sector  53.0 5.9 41.1 
private sector  35.6 18.2 46.2 
white collar  40.8 15.7 43.5 
blue collar  41.2 11.8 47.0 
union coverage  52.2 5.5 42.3 
no union coverage  35.7 18.6 45.7 
Sample Average  41.0 14.4 44.6 
 
 
Table 2: The Role of Wage Rigidities in Job Destruction 
 
  Not employed  Not employed  Not in same job  Not in same job 









































Time Dummies  NO  YES NO YES 
Log-likelihood  -1053078.6  -1049249.4 -1199016.5 -1194786.3 
Prob. χ
2>0  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations  1,927,262  1,927,262 1,927,262 1,927,262 
 
  23Appendix: The Estimated Likelihood Function 
 
The econometric model we use to explain the nominal wage growth distribution 
extends work by Altonji and Devereux (2000) [hereafter AD].  To simplify matters 
we shall begin by reviewing the AD model, which should also help to highlight the 
contribution made in this paper.  At the heart of the AD model is Akerlof et. al. 
(1996)’s concept of the notional wage: the wage that the firm would choose to pay the 
worker in the absence of the costs imposed upon it by the (unspecified) nominal 
rigidity in that period.
8  These costs create an incentive for the firm to depart from the 
notional wage and protect a worker from an otherwise desirable cut in their wage. 
 
Preliminaries: A Review of the AD Model 
 
Let us define the logarithm of the notional wage:  for individual i at time t as a 
function of a set of explanatory variables: and a time dummy:
it w ~
it x t α  to capture 
cyclical effects as follows: 
 
it it x t it w ε β α + + = ~





⎛ 2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε N it
 
In the baseline AD model an individual’s notional wage varies systematically 
according to her age, her occupation, the industry in which she is employed, and so 
on.  Equation (1) captures the fact that the average rate of pay growth is likely to vary 
across industries.  But it is also likely that pay growth is more volatile in some 
industries than others.  That could reflect the fact that product demand is more volatile 
in certain industries (perhaps through greater exposure to international competition), 
or that the use of bonus payments, merit pay and other more volatile elements of pay 
                                                 
8 In the A-D model firms are not assumed to be myopic; they are aware that when 
they set wages today they may be stuck with paying them next year as well. 
  24varies across industries (and occupations).
9 The most straightforward way to allow for 
this variation in the volatility of pay growth across different groups in the panel is to 
endogenise the parameter:  ε σ .  In particular we allow for the following relationship: 
 
σ ε + ϖ + ε σ = ε σ . it s 0 it ,         (2) 
 
where the standard deviation of the notional wage growth regression depends on some 
vector of parameters: it s .  Allowing for this heteroscedasticity does not complicate 
our estimation greatly, but it does offer the potential for us to generate a notional 
wage growth distribution which is less Gaussian in appearance.  In other words by 
extending the model in this direction we allow that the aggregate nominal wage 
growth distribution may be a mixture of many Gaussian distributions, each with 
different means and variances.  As a result, there is no restriction on the aggregate 
distribution to be either uni-modal or symmetric. 
 
Let us assume that whenever the notional wage is greater than the actual wage in the 
previous year, then the firm pays the notional wage.  However, where the notional 
wage this year is lower than the actual wage last year, firms may choose to leave the 
actual wage unchanged, up to some threshold value: ξ − .  Thereafter, firms will cut 
wages; although the firm may protect the worker from the full extent of the notional 
wage cut by some factor:ψ .  All workers are potentially covered by the nominal 
rigidity, so the model will not predict any wage growth in the interval  () 0 , ξ − , and if 
                                                 
9 Of course firms use of these more volatile elements of pay is in itself endogenous – 
they do so either because the nature of production allows them, say, to identify effort 
with greater accuracy (and reward it accordingly), or because the variability of 
conditions in the product market – from which their demand for labour is derived – 
require it. 
  25ξ  is equal to infinity, the model doesn’t predict any genuine wage cuts at all 
(although in the presence of measurement error we may observe pay cuts in the data).  
So if we define the logarithm of the actual wage as  , then the model can be 
summarised as follows: 
it w
 
ξ ε α β ε α β ψ
ε α β ξ
ε α β ε α β
− ≤ − − + + − − + + + = − −
< − − + + < − = − −
− − + + ≤ − − + + = − −
1 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1
it w it t it x if it w it t it x it w it w
it w it t it x if it w it w
it w it t it x if it w it t it x it w it w
  (3) 
 
Finally, we have to account for the potential distortions that measurement error can 
create in the observed wage growth distribution.  Assume that with probability: an 
observation is correctly measured in the data.  Further assume that when errors occur, 
those errors,  , are independently and normally distributed across individuals and 
time periods, with mean zero and variance: .  We can therefore construct a 





it η  as follows: 
 
() ()








q y probabilit with , N ~ m m
q . q . y probabilit with , N ~ m or m
q y probabilit with
m it it it










      (4) 
 
Given this composite error term we can therefore re-write our model as follows: 
 
ξ ε α β ε η α β ψ
ε α β ξ η
ε α β ε η α β
− ≤ − − + + − − + + + + = − −
< − − + + < − = − −
− − + + ≤ − − + + + = − −
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1 1
it w it t it x if it w it it t it x it w it w
it w it t it x if it it w it w
it w it t it x if it w it it t it x it w it w
(5) 
 
Incorporating Real Rigidities 
 
The AD model can explain the spike we observe in the nominal wage growth 
distribution at zero.    However the model cannot explain the distortions that real 
  26rigidities may deliver deviations further up the nominal wage growth distribution.  In 
order to capture the impact of these real wage rigidities we need to extend the model 
presented in the previous section. 
 
We allow that workers may fall under one of three regimes.  Wages may be flexible 
or unconstrained, in which case their wage is unprotected and set equal to the notional 
wage on all occasions.  Alternatively, wages may be subject to nominal rigidities, 
where we assume that the nominal wage growth is bound from below by zero.  
Finally, wages may be subject to real rigidities, where we assume that nominal wage 
growth is bound from below by an expectation of inflation.  We thus trade complexity 
in terms of the number of rigidities we allow for in the data with simplicity in how 
each of these rigidities are modelled – if a worker’s wage is protected, then the growth 
in their wage is bound from below by zero or an expectation of inflation.  In the 
terminology of the AD model, we assume that in each regime ξ tends to infinity. 
 
From the outset it should be stressed we define the incidence of nominal and real 
rigidity in wage setting not by the fraction of the workforce whose wage growth is 
constrained (the size of the spike/cluster) but by the fraction of the workforce whose 
wage growth is potentially constrained.  Nor is there any simple one for one 
correspondence between changes in the size of the regimes and changes in the 
fraction of the workforce whose wage growth is actually constrained.  For example, 
given a sharp fall in the inflation rate the number of workers protected from pay cuts 
may rise even if the fraction of the workforce in the nominal rigidity regime is falling. 
 
For a worker who falls in the unconstrained regime we know that the change in the 
log of the actual wage is given by the change in the log of their notional wage.  Once 
  27again, allowing for the possibility that wage level observations may be mismeasured, 
we have that : 
 
1 1 − − + + + = − − it w it it t it x it w it w ε η α β        (6) 
 
For those workers who fall under the nominal rigidity regime, we assume that 
irrespective of the notional wage, wages will not be cut in nominal terms from one 
period to the next.  Therefore, we have that: 
 
0 1 1
1 0 1 1
< − − + + = − −
− − + + ≤ − − + + + = − −
it w it t it x if it it w it w
it w it t it x if it w it it t it x it w it w
ε α β η
ε α β ε η α β
  (7) 
 
For those in the real rigidity regime, we assume that nominal wage growth will never 
fall below some expected inflation rate: .  We allow for the fact that this expectation 
of the inflation rate may vary across workers.  In particular we assume that these 
expectations of the inflation rate are normally distributed around some mean 
expectation:
i r
r  with variance:
2
r σ .  We therefore have that : 
 
i r it w it t it x if it i r it w it w
it w it t it x i r if it w it it t it x it w it w
< − − + + + = − −
− − + + ≤ − − + + + = − −
1 1
1 1 1
ε α β η
ε α β ε η α β
   (8) 
 
Finally, we have to specify which regime workers fall into.  It is natural to think of 
modelling the probabilities that each individual will fall under each of the three 
regimes:   with a probit equation.  But workers must fall under one of 
these three regimes so one of these three probit regressions would be redundant: an 
individual must fall under one of the three regimes with probability one! To avoid 
introducing adding-up constraints into the model we can re-write these three 
probabilities as two relative propensities, as follows: 
ri ni ui y & y , y
  28 
i z i c ni y ri y rni y 1 + = − = ϑ          ( 9) 
i z i c ui y ri y rui y 2 + = − = χ          ( 10) 
 
where   is a vector of explanatory variables and the   are standard normal 
variables.  It then follows that the probability of falling in a given regime can be 
written as a product of a number of cumulative density functions of the standard 
normally distributed variable.  The probabilities of individual i  falling in the real 
(R ), nominal (N ) and unconstrained (U ) regimes are then given as follows: 
i c s zni '
 
{} { } { } 0 Pr 0 Pr Pr > − × > − = = ui y ri y ni y ri y i R { } { } χ ϑ i c i c Φ × Φ =       ( 11) 







Φ × − Φ =
2
ϑ χ
ϑ i c i c
i c
  (12) 













ϑ χ ϑ i c i c
i c i c i c i U
     (13) 
 
We now briefly summarise our approach to estimating the values of our set of 
parameters: r , q , , , , , , m r e σ σ σ χ ϑ β , given individual data:  .  i i c , x
 
Estimation of the Model 
 
The essence of this paper is the estimation of the time series variation in the fractions 
of the workforce who are protected from nominal and real pay cuts through the 
distortions they create in the nominal wage growth distribution.  In this section we 
briefly discuss how we overcome some practical difficulties we have to overcome in 
estimating our model. 
 
Errors in the data will tend to smooth out any spikes in the underlying distribution of 
nominal pay growth that have been created by rigidities.  It follows that if the 
  29incidence of errors in the data varies from year to year then this may lead to a 
corresponding variation in our estimates of the fraction of the workforce who lie in 
each of the regimes.
10  Of course, any errors in the NESPD ought to be rare, since our 
data is reported from the payroll records of employers.  More importantly, given the 
size of the NESPD we would not expect the actual incidence of these errors to vary 
significantly from year to year.  We therefore allow for a small yet significant degree 
of measurement error and constrain the parameter:  to be constant across the sample 
period.  In the results presented in this paper we assume that 89 % of observations in 




One of the key aims of this paper is to recover time series data on the fraction of the 
workforce who fall in each of the regimes: where the (expected) real wage is 
protected (R ), where the nominal wage is protected (N ) and the where the wage is 
completely unconstrained (U ).  These in turn are determined by the explanatory 
variables:  , and the coefficients: i c χ θ,  of the model.  If the model is estimated year 
by year the marginal effect of a given covariate on the relative propensity to fall in 
each of the regimes may be found to be extremely erratic over time.  Allocation of a 
particular group of workers into either the nominal or real rigidity regime will 
essentially depend on there being significant numbers of those workers clustered 
either around zero or the identified expectation of inflation.  It would not be surprising 
to find that in one particular year the vast majority of individuals in a given industry 
                                                 
10 For example in the case of the nominal regime, for a given spike in the observed 
nominal pay growth distribution, the greater the incidence of errors in the data the 
greater the underlying spike must have been in the actual distribution, and therefore 
by implication the greater the proportion of the sample who must be in the nominal 
regime. 
11 This value was chosen via a grid search – it was the value of   which gave the 
highest average value of the likelihood function. 
q
  30received relatively large nominal pay increases.  If the model is estimated on a year by 
year basis, we are likely to find that working in that industries in that particular year is 
linked with membership of the unconstrained regime.   
 
We therefore estimate the window over a longer time frame – pooling five successive 
observations on wage growth (i.e., six years of wage level observations from the 
NESPD) – and constrain the marginal impact of most of the covariates to be fixed 
across the period. 
 
Our model assumes that if workers fall into a rigidity regime, their actual wage 
growth distribution is bound from below, so that only wage changes above these 
thresholds are set according to the notional wage relationship.  So it may be difficult 
to identify that notional wage relationship using standard regression techniques which 
will focus on the conditional mean of nominal wage growth.  Instead, we choose to 
focus on the right-hand tail of the nominal wage growth distribution, since rigidities 
will not bind in this region.
12  Our approach to identification of the dependence of the 




In the same way that classical regression techniques allow us to identify the 
relationship between the conditional mean of the dependent variable and a set of 
covariates, quantile regression techniques allow us to identify the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables at any given point in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable.  More formally, while the classical linear 
                                                 
12 Of course the further we move into the tails of the wage growth distribution the 
more likely we are to be capturing reporting errors. 
13 The following brief exposition of these techniques draws heavily on Koenker and 
Hallock (2001). 







i x i y min arg 2 β
β         (14) 
 
the linear quantile regression model derives an estimate of the conditional quantile 
function from the solution of: 
 





i x i y min arg β τ ρ
β
 
where  () u τ ρ  is the ‘tilted’ absolute value function
14 defined as follows 
 
  () { } () u . u I u 0 < − = τ τ ρ         ( 16) 
 
In practice we obtain a given conditional quantile of the notional wage growth 
distribution – where the quantile is chosen such that it is far enough from the median 
to ensure rigidities do not bind, yet close enough to minimise the loss of efficiency in 
our estimator – from which we can recover an estimate of the conditional mean of the 
wage growth distribution.   
 
If, as we have assumed, the errors of these quantile regressions are homoscedastic 
then for a given estimate of the parameter: ε σ ,
15 the median (and hence the mean, for 
                                                 
14 The intuition here is that minimising the sum of asymmetrically weighted absolute 
residuals – giving different weights to positive and negative residuals – yields the 
conditional quantile function, in the same way that minimising the sum of absolute 
residuals yields the conditional median function (Koenker and Hallock (2001) pp.145-
6). 
15 Of course, we have allowed the standard deviation of the disturbances in the 
notional wage relationship to vary systematically across individuals, according to 
[4.2].  However, at each stage in the maximisation process, we obtain an estimate of 
  32a normally distributed error) predicted wage change: 50 µ  is pinned down.  We can 
thus specify the mean notional wage growth of each individual in the panel, so that 
only the error in the notional wage growth regression is estimated alongside the 
remaining parameters of our model in the maximisation problem.  Of course, 
identifying the notional wage relationship outside the main maximisation problem has 
practical advantages as well – in so doing we reduce the size of the parameter space of 
the likelihood function significantly.   
 
The remaining parameters of our model are then estimated using maximum likelihood 
techniques.  Given the nature of the model, and in particular the number of regimes 
the model allows and the composite nature of the error term, the actual likelihood 
function is far from straightforward.  In what follows we therefore offer a heuristic 
description of the likelihood function; more details are provided in Appendix 2 of this 
paper. 
 
The Likelihood Function 
 
Given our assumptions, the growth in the nominal wages of workers who fall under 
the unconstrained regime will be normally distributed, with a mean pinned down by 
their predicted notional wage (given the actual wage last year), and a standard 
deviation which will depend on their characteristics, the standard deviation of 
measurement error in the data, together with the probability of measurement error 
occurring.  However, for those workers who fall under either the nominal or real 
rigidity regime, the probability density function of actual wage growth is truncated, 
with a potentially large point mass at either zero or the expected inflation rate.  When 
                                                                                                                                            
it , ε σ  for each individual given their characteristics, from which we can obtain an 
estimate of their mean notional wage. 
  33constructing the likelihood we therefore distinguish between two types of observation 
in each of these rigidity regimes: those where the rigidity does not have an impact on 
wage growth (firms pay the notional wage) and those where it binds (notional wages 
are swept up to that lower bound).  Our likelihood function therefore reflects this 
collection of observations into five distinct categories: 
 
¾  Individuals who fall under the unconstrained regime (U ). 
¾  Individuals who fall under the nominal rigidity regime (N ), whose wage 
growth is constrained and swept up to spike at zero. 
¾  Individuals who fall under the nominal rigidity regime (N ), whose wage 
growth is unconstrained. 
¾  Individuals who fall under the real rigidity regime (R ), whose wage growth is 
constrained, and swept up to the individual specific lower bound: .  i r
¾  Individuals who fall under the real rigidity regime (R ), whose wage growth is 
unconstrained. 
 
Given a set of observed rates of nominal wage growth:  { } i d D =  and an underlying 
set of unobserved actual rates of nominal wage growth:  { } i a A=  then for a given set 
of explanatory variables:  (and suppressing reference to the time period  ) the 
likelihood function can thus be written down as: 
i i i s , c , x t
 
() () () i s , i x , i i d L
N
i
i c i Pr D L U U ∈ × ∏ ∈ = ζ
 
  () { } ( ) ( ) i s , i x , i i d L . i s , i x , i i a Pr . i a I . i c i Pr N N N ∈ ∈ = = ∈ + 0 0
 
() { } ( ) ( ) i s , i x , i i d L . i s , i x , i i a Pr . i a I . i c i Pr N N N ∈ ∈ > > ∈ + 0 0
 
() { } ( ) ( ) i s , i x , i i d L . i s , i x , i i r i a Pr . i r i a I . i c i Pr R R R ∈ ∈ = = ∈ +
 
() { } ( ) ( ) i s , i x , i i d L . i s , i x , i i r i a Pr . i r i a I . i c i Pr R R R ∈ ∈ > > ∈ +
   ( 17) 
 
where  denotes the indicator function, and  {} ⋅ I { } r , , , , , , , m r e σ σ σ χ ϑ ψ β ζ =  
denotes our vector of model parameters, where β  is estimated outside the model.  
The contribution of each observation to the likelihood is therefore defined by a 
  34product of three terms: the probability that each individual falls in a given regime, the 
probability that the observation is constrained, and the likelihood of the observation, 
conditional on the regime and whether the observation is constrained or not.  Given 
the assumptions of normality made on the distribution of  i i i r , m , ε  the likelihood can 
then be maximised in the standard fashion. 
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